Establishment and Outsiders: Part 5

This is the last of the series on Establishment and Outsiders. In this post, I’ll deal with how each each us received by the electorate, and what it means in election terms.

Generally, the Establishment candidate has a higher floor of support. Voters feel more at ease with Establishment candidates because they tend to reinforce their views on the parties in particular and politics in general. If the voters are generally happy with the party, an Establishment nominee can consolidate that advantage. On the other hand, an Establishment candidate will have an uphill battle when the voters are not happy with the party. In other words, if you’re looking to protect a lead, the Establishment candidate is your best bet.

That said, the Outsider candidate has a higher ceiling. An Outsider candidate will have to work harder to win over the traditional Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents, but Independents who do not lean to the GOP may be willing to give them a look. The Outsider will need to take the initiative and hold it; and it could require more political capital initially, but an Outsider who can campaign well has a good deal more upside. He or she can even trump a year where the party is on the outs with the voters.

As for governing (or legislating, as the case may be), the Establishment official will largely be in the broad center of the party. Given that the Establishment isn’t driven by ideas (see part 1), “broad center” of the party need not mean center of the electorate (in fact, Bill Bolling himself if the right anchor of the GOP’s broad center).

The Outsider, by contrast, will follow his or her own way, whatever it may be. This does not by definition make an Outsider more honest, but rather less predictable. An Establishment official’s “gaps” on issues can usually be filled in by the party’s consensus view, if there is such. When an Outsider is quiet on an issue, it’s more difficult to gauge where (s)he stands.

So which one should a voter choose to nominate, if a choice is to be made? That depends on many different things: the perceived state of the electorate, the “broad center” of the party and where the Establishment candidate is within it, how complete the Outsider’s record and worldview is, each’s record as a candidate and an official (if applicable).

The point is this: one is not automatically better than the other. To quote the (admittedly fictional) Buster Kilrain, “You take men one at a time.”

Cross-posted to Bearing Drift

. . . and they call it austerity: part 6

David Malpass (Wall Street Journal) reveals the truth behind Greece’s “austerity” via (Veronique de Rugy in The Corner):

The Greek government has been practicing a particularly aggressive form of antigrowth austerity. While the private sector shrank in 2011, Greece’s government grew to 49.7% of GDP from 49.6% in 2010. To accomplish this bad outcome, Greece’s government increased its value-added tax to 23%—a hidden sales tax so high that no one should be asked to pay it or support it—and created a national property tax that transfers private-sector wealth to the government and through it to foreign creditors.

Meanwhile, Greece’s parliament kept full pay, full benefits, its fleet of BMWs, and a full staff. Greece maintained its sweetheart subsidies for businesses, banks, the army and those who choose not to work. Its sizeable delegations and facilities in Brussels, Vienna, Geneva and Washington are still large, as are the life-time pensions for politicians. Last week, Greek officials suspended work on the sale of government assets, one of the most pro-growth conditions in its IMF program.

I once referred to this version of “austerity” as big government on the cheap. It doesn’t work; it never works, but the Eurocrats refuse to admit it, and Europe continues to sink.
Cross-posted to Virginia Virtucon

Establishment and Outsiders: Part 4

This is the fourth part of my series on Establishment and Outsiders in the Republican Party of Virginia. The first two posts described the characteristics of the two. My third post presented Bill Bolling as an example if an Establishment Republican; for my Outsider example, I use Ken Cuccinelli.

I chose Cuccinelli for specific reasons, many dealing with what he is not. Cuccinelli is not more conservative than Bolling. In fact, they’re records on issues are nearly identical. They even have the same glaring error (to me), namely HB3202.

What makes Cuccinelli an Outsider, rather, is his demeanor and approach to politics. Cuccinelli is more confrontational than the typical politician, a trait which combines dynamic thinking and a sense if urgency that the more stability-oriented Establishment tends to downplay. He revels in being the underdog, and in his 2009 general election campaign, he stunned his complacent opponent by seizing the initiative and never letting go. Rather than rely on party networks, he established and grew his own.

Now, there are more than a few politicians who also fit that bill. What makes Cuccinelli more the archetype Outsider was his almost disastrous failure to try the Establishment role in his 2007 re-election campaign. While Bolling’s attempt to play against type as an insurgent running for Governor in 2007-8 was generally problematic, Cuccinelli’s attempt to play by the Establishment playbill was a barely mitigated fiasco. He nearly destroyed his credibility by voting for HB3202. His campaign tried the incumbency card – and flubbed badly. If not for an opponent nearly everyone acknowledges as subpar, he might have lost in 2007 and become a brief footnote in local political history.

As it was, he squeaked through, and never used the Establishment plan again. He was the first (and if memory serves, the only) elected Republican to back Bob Marshall in 2008; in his AG campaign next year he ran against an opponent right out of central casting, and beat him for the nomination. He played in the role he likes best – the underdog – against Steve Shannon, and turned a race that worried many Republicans into a rout.

By choosing to run for Governor, he will likely not run for re-election for anything until the 2020s. I doubt that is accidental.

In short, Cuccinelli is most comfortable going against the odds and shaking things up; he also has the success that keeps him on the good side (so far) of the line between dynamic and reckless.

Again, and I emphasize this once more because some BD commenters are having trouble processing this, Cuccinelli is not an Outsider because he is more conservative than Bolling (in fact, he’s not). This isn’t about principle or ideology. It is about attitude, method, and the nature of the man. That is what makes Cuccinelli an Outsider.

Cross-posted to Bearing Drift

Establishment and Outsiders: Part 3

This is the third part of the blog series. The first two dealt with describing the Establishment and Outsiders. In this part, I give an example of the typical Establishment politician: Lieutenant Governor Bill Bolling.

Note, I said Establishment, not moderate. The two need not be the same, and in the case of Bolling, they certainly aren’t. However, Bolling’s career shows a man very comfortable with the Establishment – and more important, badly out of place as an Outsider.

Bolling made his state-level debut in 1995, when he ran for State Senate against long-serving (and deeply despised by then) Democrat Elmo Cross. The GOP was so determined to defeat Cross that Bolling was, for a time, the most prolific fundraiser of all challengers (at one point, only House Speaker Tom Moss and Brandon Bell had raised more money – among all Virginia candidates that year). Bolling won, and quickly built his ties in the Virginia GOP. He even took a slice of Spotsylvania County during redistricting (the first and only GOP attempt to use the lines to defeat Edd Houck), not that it even came close to endangering him.

Bolling was clearly a party man, even when he disagreed with caucus leadership (such as during the tax increase debacle of 2004). He was a vote against the tax hikes, but not a voice (that is an observation, not a criticism). In his campaign for Lieutenant Governor in 2005, Bolling used his ties within the party to turn his primary opponent (Shaun Connaughton) into a moderate Outsider, turning the usually observed division on its head.

But it would be after he was elected LG in 2005 that Bolling’s Establishment nature became clear – and contrary to outward appearances, it was not his support for HB3202 that did it.

Rather, it was his one attempt to act against type – his aborted gubernatorial campaign.

The Establishment divided into two different reactions: some were neutral, others backed Bob McDonnell instead. As such, Bolling was forced to run an Outsider campaign, and he was clearly uncomfortable doing it. When he switched gears and ran for re-election, the relief of party leaders may have dominated the headlines, but Bolling’s own relief was also very clear.

Thus had Bolling built a career based on relationships, experience, and wise use of political capital.

Again, Bolling is no moderate; in fact his only real blemish on his conservative record is HB3202 (and I suspect in calling it a blemish I may hold the minority view among the contributors). He his, however, Establishment through and through.

Cross-posted to Bearing Drift

Tim Kaine admits the Democrats have been lying about Social Security all along

Ever since FDR first proposed Social Security, he and his fellow Democrats have insisted that the program was a bunch of individual accounts into which Americans put money for their retirement. This has made any attempt to reform the listing program politically impossible, as millions of Americans were convinced that “their” personal Social Security account would be threatened.

Here’s the thing: it was never true.

Now, of all people, Tim Kaine, in an attempt to criticize Republicans, explodes the seventy-plus-year lie (Falls Church News Press):

The idea of taking money from one generation to give it to another is fundamentally what Republicans don’t like.

Actually, that is fundamentally what the Democrats have insisted – for decades – is not Social Security. Kaine has just admitted that his party has been lying on this issue for over three quarters of a century.

Next step is admitting that the program is completely unsustainable in the 21st Century. With any luck, the Democrats will admit to that before 2089.

Cross-posted to Bearing Drift

Establishment and Outsiders: Part 2

This is the second part of my series on the subject. Part 1 dealt with the characteristics of the Establishment. Part 2 looks at the Outsiders.

At the heart, the Outsider disagrees with an Establishment decision (or apparent decision) about how or where to spend political capital. Be it a candidate choice, policy decision, or internal rule, the Outsider has decided the issue is important enough, and the Establishment’s position so egregious, that it must be changed. Normally, in the GOP, Outsiders are to the Establishment’s right, but this is not always so (McCain, 2000). The issue or issues at hand are not necessarily consistent either. The characteristics, however, are very consistent.

A preference for dynamism: It should come as no surprise that Outsiders are more accepting of change, but generally it goes deeper than that. Essentially, the Outsider is more than willing to break some eggs to make the omelette. In fact, the eggs can, if the Outsider isn’t too careful, become more important than the omelette itself. Successful Outsiders don’t succumb to this, but they do appreciate change far more than the Establishment, and will even welcome unintended consequences that come with the change (for the successful ones, such consequences are at least anticipated and planned for).

A sense of urgency: Taking on the Establishment is hardly easy, so there will usually be a good reason, and typically, that reason is urgent. The Outsider sees himself or herself as the last line defense from the horrific effects of the Establishment’s mistake. As such, the long view is dramatically shortened.

Finally, an aversion to Establishment language or arguments: At first this sounds obvious, but it goes deeper than the issue of disagreement. The more the Establishment tries to defend its point of view, the more Outsiders tend to think the Establishment’s methods are as bad as the erroneous decision. I noticed his when I tried to explain why I felt Bob Marshall had a better chance of defeating Mark Warner than Jim Gilmore did. Of course, no Establishment Republican agreed, not even Marshall’s people (save the candidate himself) were willing to consider the argument. Because “electability” was usually an Establishment argument, it was ignored by most of the Outsiders as a distraction.

This shows the larger motivation of Outsiders: they care more about why a campaign is conducted, rather than how.

Because of this, Outsiders can be very helpful to the party. At the least, they can force the Establishment to defend their policy decisions in a more robust and well-thought-out manner. At best (for the Outsiders), they can force their views on the Establishment, or convince it of the error of its way.

Unless, of course, it becomes personal (from either side), in which case we’re stuck with the wisdom of David Mamet – scriptwriter for Hoffa – via the main character:

A real grievance can be resolved. Differences can be resolved. But an imaginary hurt? A slight? That motherf**ker’s gonna hate you ’til the day he dies.

Cross-posted to Bearing Drift

Establishment and Outsiders: Part 1

This is the first of a series inspired by the state of the Republican Party of Virginia, which appears to be in the middle of a battle royale between the establishment and the outsiders. The various district conventions have led to many changes, and angry words. It has, however, provided a way to differentiate between the two. Part 1 will explain the general characteristics of an “establishment” Republican.
It will surprise many when I say this, but the establishment is not defined by issues. Rather, it is various personality traits that come to the core. They are as follows.

Personal loyalty: Establishment Republicans tend to value personal bonds very highly. Friends matter to them, especially friendships made during a particular campaign or issue battle (perhaps when both were outsiders). This does not mean friendship trumps issues necessarily (although usually that conflict doesn’t come up), but it does mean that those friendships will be more important than whatever a newcomer has to offer.

Experience: Establishment Republicans tend to appreciate those who have already been “in the arena.” First, because it establishes a political bond in world where such things are rare. Secondly, they likely learned the same lessons while in politics, and thus reinforce each other’s thinking. Finally, and most importantly, experienced politicians and activists tend to be better at avoiding mistakes that novices make.

Finally, political efficiency: this tends to be seen as “pragmatism” or “electability,” but neither really match up to what Establishment Republicans are thinking. Given their experience, these people understand the importance of political capital, and are less willing to spend it needlessly (as they see it). Resources plowed into an unwinnable race or issue campaign can be enough to turn a tide elsewhere. The larger picture is key to them.

Of course, with these traits cone weaknesses. The emphasis on personal relationships can lead to collectivism; the experience emphasis can create a feedback loop focused on “the last war;” and these factors can lead to a misread of what is a decent investment of political capital. Still, trust, experience, and political wisdom count.

Notice I haven’t discussed ideas. That’s for a reason. The Establishment isn’t allergic to ideas; it’s just not what drives them as a group. When the Establishment acts as such (or a large chunk of it), it assumes that the issues are largely settled or agreed.

In short, the Establishment focuses on how campaigns are run, not why.

Cross-posted to Bearing Drift

The real reason the CCP owning so much US debt is a bad thing

I really think Irwin Stelzer should know better. The Weekly Standard economics writer usually leans toward the “engagement” crowd when it comes to the Chinese Communist Party, but he always managed to steer clear of the Kool-Aid.

This time, though, he falls for a different myth, the debt myth.

China can easily turn that feeble recovery into a downturn by cutting back on purchases of U.S. treasury IOUs, driving interest rates up.

Leaving aside the fact that the Fed has told anyone who will listen that they will vacuum up as many T-bills as is required to keep interest rates near zero, Stelzer should know – as Gordon Chang does – that paper power is really a paper tiger.

No, the real problem with the CCP buying so much of our debt is that they can’t stop, meaning the traditional incentives to get serious about deficit reduction (the fear creditors will stop lending) doesn’t apply. Instead of firm warnings from Wall Street or the City (London), we have a regime desperate to keep lending us money in order to maintain their cheap currency and export sectors.

Thus, our day if reckoning will be delayed, but hurt that much harder when it finally comes.

Cross-posted to the China e-Lobby and Virginia Virtucon

. . . and they call it austerity, part 5

So Spain’s desperate attempt to balance its books as the EU orders includes higher taxes, shifting spending cuts to regional and local governments, and . . . a bank bailout. I kid you not (NRO – The Corner):

Less than 24 hours after the French election, Spain was putting together a taxpayer-funded rescue package for something called Bankia, according to the FT:

Spain is planning a state bail-out of Bankia, the country’s third biggest bank by assets, in a move likely to involve the injection of billions of euros of public money into the troubled lender.

Is this what politicians think that European voters want to spend their “saved” austerity money on — more bank bailouts?

I suspect the EU politicians don’t think much of what the voters want at all.

Lest we forget, the nation that had recovered the most quickly is the one that refused to believe in “too big to fail” and let the sick banks die: Iceland. Sadly, the Icelandic government is drinking the euro Kool-aid . . .

. . . which to eurozone inhabitants, is more like poison.

Cross-posted to Virginia Virtucon

Steve McIntyre exposes another global warming alarmist fudge

Steve McIntyre has spent nearly a decade revealing the mathematical and statistical mistakes – or worse – of the global warming alarmists. In his Climate Audit blog, he exposes yet another example of how the alarmists chose to ignore (again) data that refused to fit the anthropogenic global warming theory.

McIntyre details the data manipulation and deception in his Climate Audit blog (via WUWT).

Had their Yamal-Urals regional chronology had been in accordance with their previous results, I am completely convinced that they would have used it in Briffa et al 2008 and/or their October 2009 online article without a second thought. My surmise is that the apparent failure of the (still withheld) Yamal-Urals regional chronology to accord with their expectations caused CRU not to use it in Briffa et al 2008. I realize that this is a harsh statement, but it’s what I think.

For

those who are keeping track (admittedly not easy given the numbers), we are now at thirty-eight examples of data manipulation, errors, and other shenanigans from global warming alarmism, and that’s just from what I’ve been able to blog on this subject over the last two and a half years.

In this case, though, not only did they ignore inconvenient data, but as McIntyre shows, they were fairly dishonest about it, throwing up multiple and contradictory reasons that he (McIntyre) easily filets.

Will they never learn?

Cross-posted to Virginia Virtucon