The case for limited intervention against Qaddafi

I have been quiet on events transpiring in Libya, in no small part because I myself was undecided on the subject.

Contrary to most on today’s right, I am not averse to military intervention abroad. In fact, I think the role of a robust foreign policy in keeping domestic government small is highly underappreciated. Like most on the right, I hold no illusions regarding Mummuar Qaddafi (when I first heard of him, in the 1980s, it was spelled with a Q).

What held me back was a concern best stated by National Review‘s Victor Davis Hanson regarding the anti-Qaddafi forces:

We have no idea who exactly the Libyan protesters are or what they represent.

That sums up my worries quite well; there was also the fact that Qaddafi, for his virulent anti-American history, appeared chastened by the liberation of Iraq.

After some more thought, however, I came to the realization that America’s interests require that we provide some aid to the opposition. Here’s why:

• Qaddafi will certainly consider us his enemies again, thanks to President Obama’s demands that he step down. That Obama seems unwilling to do anything to back up his words will be seen as weakness, not the “real” policy (to quote a formerly iconic politician, “Don’t tell me words don’t matter”). As such, preventing Qaddafi’s triumph is critical.
• Even in the worst-case scenario (Qaddafi’s opponents are as anti-American as he is), it’s better to have them fighting each other than us. One of George W. Bush’s statements in his 9/20/01 speech to the nation on what he would do to terrorists is key here: “We will set them against one another.” History has shown the value in this. An argument between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960 led to the most dramatic Cold War switch a decade later. Saddam Hussein’s ambitions were greatly restrained while he fought Iran (the mullahs in Tehran have always been active in mischief, but far less so during their eight-year war with Saddam).
• Finally, there’s no reason the worst-case scenario must stay that way, and again, recent history points the way. In the early 1980s, the Communist regime in Ethiopia fell into disarray and civil war. At first, backing Communist rebels over a Communist regime seemed not worth the trouble, but we did it anyway, and by the time the rebels were in a position to topple the government, said rebels had left Marxism and anti-Americanism behind. Today, Ethiopia is our best ally in East Africa this side of tiny Djibuoti.

These reasons are why I have come down in favor of intervention. However, it must be the right kind of intervention, one that will minimize loss of blood and treasure while maximizing impact within my concerns (i.e., it needs to keep the opposition strong enough to hold Qaddafi in check, at least until we have a better idea of who they are).

That leads to one optimal solution: military aid, without military deployment.

I know a “no-fly zone” is all the rage, but those of us who remember the Afghan mujahedin of the 1980s know that Stinger missiles accomplished the same purpose without losing American planes or pilots. I suspect a 2010 equivalent of the Stinger will do just fine.

There are already plenty of Libyans willing to fight Qaddafi. At present, enabling them to keep up the fight is the most we need to do – i.e., the most that our interests compel us to do.

That is, however, something, making it different from the empty words flowing from the White House.

Cross-posted to BD

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