What America can do for Georgia

There have been a few commenters (both here and on the Shotgun) wondering what the United States can do for Georgia.  The editors of National Review Online have some answers:

In the long term, however, America and its allies must demonstrate that Russia has lost more than it gained from this conflict. One first step must be for the U.S. to agree with its NATO allies to confirm an offer of NATO membership for both Georgia and Ukraine. Poland, the Baltic states, and other central European countries are already calling for an emergency NATO summit that might issue such a declaration. Only Germany seems to stand in the way of such a decision — and the Germans should be told firmly that their opposition to Georgia membership earlier this year encouraged the siloviki to mount this attack. Time for them to forget Rapallo once and for all, and join the rest of the West in resisting the re-emergence of the USSR.

Second, we should ask Poland and the Czech Republic to hold any necessary referendums on installing a missile defense system to be held at once — and campaign on the argument that Russia has just shown that it cannot be trusted to be a good international neighbor. Such a victory would lose the Kremlin far more than it gained in the Caucasus.

Third, once the fighting has definitively stopped, the U.S. should offer a generous rebuilding program in Georgia — to be carried out, in part, by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. That is one piece of social work that the Pentagon should relish.

There is, however, one small problem with this strategy: Georgia may already soon be lost.  NRO‘s Rich Lowry spoke to Fred Kagan, and Fred was not exactly optimistic:

If, as reports suggest, Russian forces have occupied Zugdidi, Senaki, and Gori, then they have not only invaded Georgia in violation of any possible international legal justification, but have also taken possession of Georgia’s only means of communication with the Western World.  If the Russians hold Gori, then Georgia’s only land-sea lines of communication run through Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea or along secondary, mountain roads to Batumi and/or Turkey.

If the Investigative Committee proceeds as seems likely, it will most probably indict Saakashvili and other members of the Georgian government for crimes committed under Russian law, and Russian can then presumably demand their extradition in exchange for opening the Tbilisi-Poti road.

Alternatively, Russian forces are in an excellent position to take Georgia if they chose to do so.

The likeliest outcome at this stage is that Moscow insists on the departure of Saakashvili and other high members of the Georgian government from power and from the country, and then returns to its positions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with significantly increased force presence.  In that scenario, Georgia will be helplessly under Russian domination.

We must make it abundantly clear that this will not stand.  Jonathon Foreman has that in mind when he recommends this (NRO - emphasis added):

We don’t have to go to war for her (fortunately for irresolute Western governments, Georgia’s not in NATO) but we must back her in every other way: diplomatically, economically and with military technology and advice, now and after any ceasefire that is called.

What Russia wants is a return to the days when one of their stooges ran Georgia.  We cannot allow that to happen.  As Foreman notes:

. . . if we let our ally be defeated and humiliated by the Russians, everyone will know that friendship with America carries more risk than rewards. Moreover it will genuinely signal a new age of American isolation. The diminution and weakness described or predicted by so many “declinist” authors will become a reality.

This means one thing – a return to the Reagan doctrine on Georgia.  I would recommend we do the following:

• A statement making it abundantly clear that we will recognize no government in Georgia unless Mikhail Saakashvili is in charge
• In the event that free Georgia falls, provide whatever aid we can (including and especially military aid) to the Georgian resistance against Russian occupation
• If the rest of NATO won’t admit Georgia, form an alliance pact with the Baltics, the Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Free Georgia be signed
• Encourage the above nations to join us in coming to Free Georgia’s aid (I’m guessing there won’t be much encouragement required)
• Move forward with domestic sources of energy (yes, Ms. Pelosi, that includes offshore drilling); not necessarily to replace the oil delivered in the Georgian pipeline, but to increase the overall supply of oil, and thus thwart Russia’s market power in the stuff

Most importantly, we can not assume Russia will simply stop with Georgia (Foreman again):

As Russian bombs rain down on key Georgian military bases, Ukraine and the Baltic states know all too well that they are next on the list for Russian invasion — probably with the same pretext of protecting Russian citizens — if the Kremlin gets away with crushing Georgia.

Also watching what happens in the Caucasus with one eye on the U.S. will be allied countries like Taiwan (it knows that U.S. corporations have long been pushing successive U.S. administrations to abandon Taiwanese democracy), Pakistan (it’s been dumped before), India, Turkey, the Gulf states, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, Australia, and Colombia… the list goes on.

When the Soviet Union was out in the open, we reversed its gains in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and of course, in Eastern Europe.  We can do it again.  We can, and we must, make sure any Russian conquest of Georgia be temporary and pyrrhic.  If we do that, we will strike a blow for freedom for the world to see.

If we do not, the subsequent blow struck to freedom will also be on display for the world to see – and the consequences will take decades from which to recover.