On the late Benazir Bhutto, and Pakistan’s future

Welcome Shotgun readers – FYI, I am an American blogger, “liberal” is an ideological term, not a partisan one (here’s the explanation); were I Canadian, I would not support any Liberal Party – anywhere.

“Everyone’s an expert on Pakistan, a faraway country of which we know everything.  It seems to me a certain humility is appropriate.” – Mark Steyn

These words ring in my ears as I write; I can only ask that those who read this remember them as well.

Like the rest of us, Benazir Bhutto was a flawed human being; unlike the rest of us, her flaws were exposed throughout her political career.  Despite this, she may have been, while she lived, the best chance Pakistan had for a future free of tyranny and terror.  Sadly, she was assassinated this morning.  This is a terrible tragedy for her, her family, and her supporters.  What it means for Pakistan is not so clear.

In order to understand why Pakistan’s future was and is so murky, we must look to the past.  In fact, a lot of what we face in the Wahhabist-Ba’athist-Khomeinist War can be traced in the history of Pakistan.

Bhutto’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was a leading Pakistani politician in the 1970s; he was popular, corrupt, and sympathetic to the Soviets.  By the late 70s, however, his popularity was on the wane, and elections held in 1977 were marred with charges of vote-rigging.  By the summer, Bhutto was ousted in a coup led by General Muhhamad Zia ul-Haq.  It is at this point where the “Wahhab” piece of the WBK war begins to focus.

Whenever I hear the nonsense about America training or funding Osama bin Laden, I almost want to scream.  There is no evidence of this assertion that we made a “deal with the devil” – as it were – in Afghanistan.

However, we did make a “deal with the devil” in Pakistan.  There is no question General Zia was a strong American ally, but it was he who began the Wahhabization of Pakistan – especially within the Pakistani military.  He was so successful that countries that have since become home to Pakistani immigrant populations (i.e., Great Britain) are having more trouble assimilating younger ethnic Pakistanis than older.

According to Daniel Pipes, Zia was moving away from the Wahhabism he had unleashed on his people by the last 1980s.  We’ll never know, because Zia died in a plane crash in the summer of 1988; with Wahhabized military and elite still intact.

By the end of 1988, Benazir Bhutto had returned to Pakistan and was elected Prime Minister.  The military bounced her from power within two years, only to see her return in 1993.  Her second term (also ended by military coup) was praiseworthy, but also troubling (Iain Murry, NRO - The Corner):

. . . the Telegraph‘s commendably objective obituary of Benazir Bhutto is here. After her ineffective first premiership, many forget that her second tenure was almost Thatcherite:

Her tight monetary policy produced a dramatic reduction in the budget deficit, pulling the country’s economy back from the brink of collapse, and earning it a clean bill of health from the IMF and World Bank.

The massive inflow of foreign investment gave rise to expectations of a new era of economic development for Pakistan. Her offer of lucrative packages for foreign investors garnered contracts for infrastructure projects worth many billions of dollars. And her privatisation programme was commended for its transparency and broad ownership approach.

Sadly, her father’s authoritarianism manifested itself in other areas. What Pakistan needed was a free-market, secular approach that guaranteed important freedoms. She almost delivered that, but not quite.

Indeed, it was during this, her second term of office, that the Pakistani military first looked to the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan, although how much control she had over that is highly debatable.  What is not in dispute is that General/President Pervez Musharraf himself was a Taliban sponsor until September 11, 2001.

While in exile, Bhutto made it clear she stood with neither with Musharraf nor al Qaeda (the latter is already claiming credit for her assassination – Michael Ledeen, The Corner).  In fact, she was one of the very few who insisted on repeating the inconvenient but important truth: that neither Musharraf nor his military are reliable allies in the WBK War.

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Musharraf had a heaven-sent opportunity.  Never able to secure a majority of Pakistanis to support him, he had choice: to reach out to the democrats (Bhutto et al) and secure an anti-terrorist polity in Pakistan for the foreseeable future, or freeze out the democrats and allow the terrorist sympathizers to gain as a result.  Not only did he choose the latter (New York Post), he has even reached out to the terrorist-backers themselves to isolate democratic forces.

This is why I have never considered Musharraf an ally, and still don’t to this day.  It is also why I (and many others) never bought his me-or-the-terrorists rationale.  Finally, it is why I remain unsure that al Qaeda did this all by itself.

This is not to say I think Musharraf was personally involved with the murder,  or was even aware of it; he’s too smooth for that.  But when it comes to the Pakistani military, Michael Rubin (Corner again) put it best:

I don’t want to say much; it’s been a few years since I’ve been to Pakistan. But this artificial dichotomy between supporters of Musharraf as suspects and Islamists being voiced by some TV commentators right now seems to miss the point.

The problem in Pakistan, especially since the days of Zia ul-Haq, has been the extent to which radical Islamist cells infiltrate the military, ISI, and police. Compounding this problem is the defensiveness with which Pakistani generals and security officers deny the problem and the corruption which lets such infiltration continue.

In other words, when it comes to the Pakistani armed forces, we literally cannot tell friend from foe.

So what does this mean for the WBK war?  That depends on questions that as of now remain unanswered:

Will the elections be held?  The assassination is a near-perfect excuse to delay them, but if Musharraf shifts them beyond February, it will increase speculation that he is taking advantage of Bhutto’s murder or, worse, had a hand in it.  Meanwhile, a demoralized and disunited Pakistani People’s Party would have a much harder time against Musharraf’s candidates.  I’m guessing the show will go on.

Can Bhutto’s party regroup?  I have no idea on this one.  If they can, they could easily romp to victory.  Bhutto was a personal liability to her party in many, many ways.  This transforms her from flawed candidate to mourned martyr.  However, if the PPP factionalizes and splits; it could all be over.

What about Nawaz Sharif?  The “other” opposition leader has a much shadier history regarding the terrorist-backers (Stanley Kurtz – The Corner), but his anti-Musharraf credentials are nearly impeccable.  If the finger points back to the military and the PPP can’t recover, Sharif could be the main beneficiary, which is not good.

What are the odds of the terrorist-backers taking over Pakistan?  That’s the big question, and once again, there is no real answer.  Already, Musharraf has ceded portions of the country over to al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Sharif could be worse, while the successor to Bhutto may not be strong enough to reassert order there.  This, of course, assumes one faction will actually win; it could be just as likely that none of them can rule on their own, which given their history can only enhance the power of the terrorist-backers as kingmakers.

What can we do?  Sadly, not much, besides continue to kill every terrorist we find in Afghanistan; maintain a very close friendship with India, and hope that the PPP can get its act together.  One thing we have in our corner: India is much more afraid of an al Qaedist Pakistan than we are (they would be the terrorists’ first target) so if worse comes to worst, we’ll have a very large, powerful, and increasingly dynamic ally.  The bad news is – well, I don’t really need to tell you the bad news, do I?

One more thing, this makes it abundantly clear that America must be vigilant and strong.  The WBK War has no timeouts; it is ongoing and in several theaters at once.  Republicans looking at Huckabee or (as much as I admire him on other issues) Dr. Paul need to take note.  Democrats may want to rethink their party allegiance.

I conclude simply: Benazir Bhutto, R.I.P.  Your country (and mine) will sorely miss you.